

**The Buddhist Intent of *Parārthānumāna*
and its *Hetu*-Centric Commitment**

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Abstract:

The paper discusses anumāna and its variety in general from the point of view of inferential cognition for the sake of oneself as well as for the sake of others; i.e. svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna as given in the Buddhist tradition of logic, especially with parārthānumāna, its nature and role. The paper argues that the Buddhist intent of division of anumāna into svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna was to bring Buddha-vacana-s under the category of parārthānumāna and to save them from being classified under Śabda pramāṇa. It contends that such a division was not just an epistemological demand, but had a deeper philosophical significance in the Buddhist conceptual framework. Such division is, therefore, intended to reject the role of Śabda as an extra causal means or pramāṇa. The paper identifies the logical commitment in Buddhist tradition as hetu-centric commitment as it differs from the Nyāya tradition of vyāpti-centric one.

Keywords: anumāna, svārthānumāna, parārthānumāna, Hetu, Vyāpti, śabdapramāṇa, hetvābhāsa, Hetucakra Damaru, Ekapada-paryudāsa, Dvipada-paryudāsa.

Prologue

In Indian epistemological tradition perception (*pratyakṣa*) is considered as the strongest reliable causal means of valid knowledge. It is so basic that no other casual means of knowledge can come into existence without the assistance of perception. Similarly, among indirect means inference (*anumāna*) has been given a status of superior causal means of knowledge. The superiority of

inference is not just because it, beyond our limited perceptions, covers the wide range of our cognitive sphere more extensively but also because it is substantially supportive to other indirect casual means of knowledge. Perhaps, that is why Buddhist logicians thought it reasonable to somehow reduce all other means of indirect knowledge to inference itself. Not only this, in the very epistemological framework of Buddhist logic all determinate/conceptual/categorical knowledge have been included within the spectrum of inference. Generally, inference is divided into two types, namely, *Svārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of oneself) and *Parārthānumāna* (inference for the sake of others). In fact, being the knowledge for the sake of oneself i.e. *Svārtha*-form is obvious to all *pramāṇa*-s but the knowledge for the sake of other self-i.e. *Parārtha*-form is only possible to *anumāna* (inference). This also extends the scope of inferential cognition to a new dimension. Although there has been a long as well as ancient tradition of classifying *anumāna* into three types, namely *Pūrvavat*, *Śeṣvat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, it is Ācārya Dignāga who has classified *anumāna* as *svārtha* and *Parārtha* for the first time and thereafter this classification has got a common acceptance in Indian tradition of epistemic logic. No doubt, the division of *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *Parārtha* has its own epistemological significance. But it is Ācārya Dignāga who gave a foundational division with a deeper insight. That is to say, Buddha himself had no intention that his teachings be accepted as *Śabdapramāṇa* (verbal testimony) [9, verse. 3587].¹ That is precisely the cause that the Buddhist tradition doesn't categorize *Buddha-vacanas* as *Śabdapramāṇa*. Then, it will be pertinent to ask: under which kind of *pramāṇas* *Buddha-vacanas* and subsequent derived knowledge should be categorized? In fact, *Buddha-vacana*-s can be called as a set of *statements or propositions* producing *Parārthānumāna* because they were exhorted by Buddha not as commandments or instructions but as reasoned or rational statements. Therefore, the *Buddha-vacana*-s and the derived knowledge thereof are grasped in the form of *Parārthānumāna*. Dharmakīrti has hinted something similar at the end of the first chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* [3, pp. 285-287] but Prajñākaragupta, in his *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkārahāṣya*, has clearly stated that *Bauddha-āgamas* are not commandments or instructions, rather their form is of *Parārthānumāna* [6, ch. 1/135, p.269].²

Noticeably, it is a great characteristic of *Bauddha āgamas* (texts containing *Buddha vacana*-s) that they were compiled and grasped as reasoned and argumentative statements of Buddha. They are different from other *āgamas* in that they are not commandments or instructions. This is why, despite being said by the Omniscient one, they cannot be categorized as *Śabda Pramāṇa* (verbal testimony). They are, rather, productive of *Parārthānumāna*. Hence, Dignāga's strategy of dividing *anumāna* (inference) into *svārtha* and *parārtha* should be understood as demand of Buddhist conceptual framework to keep *Buddha-vacana*-s free from the category of *Śabda Pramāṇa* (verbal testimony). That is to say that reason behind such a division was not just an epistemological demand but had a deeper philosophical demand of Buddhist conceptual framework. Here one might argue that if *Parārthānumāna* is actually the propositional articulation (for the sake of others) of *svārthānumāna* itself then, are *Buddha-vacana*-s like *svārthānumāna*, and not direct knowledge? In reply, it can be maintained that it is well known that Buddha attained enlightenment in the form of direct (*sākṣāt*) knowledge but this direct knowledge is non-categorical (*nirvikalpaka*) or indeterminate in nature. When non-categorical or indeterminate knowledge is revealed through language it naturally takes the form of categorical / propositional knowledge and comes under the domain of *anumāna*. Again, *svārthānumāna*, being prior to *parārthānumāna*, is not a rule. It is just the case that only argumentative or rational statements can lead to *parārthānumāna*.

I

Although *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* both are *anumāna*, still Buddhist logicians differentiated their nature and called first one as epistemic and second as verbal [4, *Svārthānumāna Pariccheda*-1, p.87].³ Importantly, here the adjectives – epistemic and verbal – should be understood in the sense of 'for the sake of oneself' and 'for the sake of others' respectively and not in the sense of non-categorical and categorical or unverbalizable and verbalizable. When a person attains

inferential knowledge arguing in his own mind it is called *svārthānumāna*, e.g. we come to know (inferring in our mind) that there is fire on the hill while seeing smoke on the hill. But when we wish to convince others in debate or simply want to make others know the same thing, e.g. ‘fire is on the hill’ or ‘hill is fiery’ we use syllogistic propositions/statements, it is called *parārthānumāna*. In fact, exteriorization (verbalization) or language-use is the only medium through which we can convey our knowledge to others. *Parārthānumāna* is verbal only in this sense.

Here one might ask that if exteriorization (verbalization) or language-use is the only medium through which we can provide others the same knowledge then perception should also be classified or divided into *svārtha* and *parārtha* like *anumāna*. For instance, when we see a calf running in the field, it is our *svārtha-pratyakṣa* (perception for one’s own sake). But when we are telling others by pointing at calf as ‘the calf is running in the field’ why should it not be called *parārthapratyakṣa*? Durveka Miśra [7, p. 89]⁴ has discussed this question in his *Dharmottarapradīpa*. He holds that the statement ‘the calf is running in the field’ cannot be called productive of *parārthapratyakṣa* unlike sentences indicating *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) between *hetu* or *liṅga* (reason/middle) and *sādhya* (probandum); i.e. *pakṣadharmā* of *hetu* (presence of *hetu* in *pakṣa*, i.e. smoke on the hill) are productive of *parārthānumāna*. For, in this statement the report of auxiliary causal ingredients like senses, light etc. which are productive of perception, are not included. At most, the sentence ‘the calf is running in the field’ produces the desire to see or visualize in others and orient them towards it. In this way it can be maintained that Indian epistemological tradition has no trend of dividing the means of knowledge other than *anumāna* into *svārtha* and *parārtha*. It is a different matter that such a question has neither been raised in an elaborated manner nor has its epistemological possibilities been properly explored.

In fact, no open deliberation on the possibilities of division of perceptual knowledge into *svārtha* and *parārtha* along with its possible implications is not a mistake unknowingly done; rather it was a well-considered move. By disclosing this move the epistemological uniqueness of *anumāna* (inference) and through this, the logical departure in Indian epistemology too can be highlighted. Notably, for letting others attain the same knowledge which we have attained, i.e. for making others aware of the same knowledge through exteriorization (verbalization), either resultant aspect of knowledge or causal aspect of knowledge. There is no other way.

Now the nature and status of the causal means of knowledge like perception etc. is such that while transmitting it to others through exteriorization (verbalization) we can transfer only the resultant aspect of knowledge to others. Its causal aspect can neither be made available nor be transmitted to others. But here it is worth noticing that when we make it available to others the resultant aspect of knowledge attained by any means, say through its recitation/utterance, it becomes the object of verbal knowledge for others; and in this way, it is just like *śabdapramāṇa* (verbal testimony) for them. We see a calf running in the field and when we make available this particular *svārtha – pratyakṣa* to others by stating ‘the calf is running in the field’; it doesn’t become *parārthapratyakṣa* for the listener. Rather, it becomes, in certain circumstances, a means of producing desire in listener to see the object or of being oriented towards the object. But, where there is no circumstance in accordance with producing desire to see, the knowledge occurs through verbal reporting that ‘the calf is running in the field’. Hence, if making available the causal aspects of non-inferential casual means of knowledge to others were possible, the division of such *prāmāṇa*-s into *svārtha* and *parārtha* would have been in proper sense.

But the case of *anumāna* (inference) is quite different. Its nature and state are not like *pratyakṣa* and other non-inferential means of knowledge. Really, we use to transmit the causal aspect of our (inferential) knowledge into other’s consciousness by verbalizing it in a particular way. When *svārthānumāna* is recited or reported through syllogisms of *pratijñā* (proposition), *hetu* (reason), *udāharaṇa* (explanatory example), *upanaya* (application of example) and *nigamana* (statement of conclusion), it is causal ingredients of that knowledge which is transmitted to other’s consciousness through such procedure. Perhaps, such facility is not available with any means of knowledge other than *anumāna*. This is the reason why the knowledge produced as *parārthānumāna* is neither a borrowed knowledge nor is knowledge produced out of mere listening

of words; rather it is an independent knowledge (*pramiti*) caused in the consciousness of a person. This is the uniqueness of *anumāna* (inference) and because of which it remains as *anumāna* despite being other-oriented (*partaḥ*), whereas means of knowledge other than *anumāna* when made other-oriented (*partaḥ*), they all, in a sense, are transformed into mere *śabdapramāṇa* (verbal testimony). In this context, it wouldn't be unjustified to make a comment on *śabdapramāṇa* (verbal testimony) that *pauruṣeya* (man-given) *śabdapramāṇa* in itself is nothing but full exteriorization of the trustworthy speech of the resultant aspect of perceptual (*sākṣāt*) knowledge.

Understanding *pauruṣeya śabda pramāṇa* (man-given verbal testimony) in this way resolves the binding of taking *śabda* (word) as an extra means of knowledge in any epistemology. This assertion of taking *śabda* (verbal testimony) as a causal means of knowledge may cause a problem for *Cārvaka*-s and *Vaiśeṣika*-s but there is no room for such difficulty in Buddhist epistemology. The reason is that on the one hand, Buddhist notion of *pratyakṣa* is *nirvikalpaka* (non-categorical or indeterminate) and therefore its exteriorization (verbalization) is not possible and on the other hand, Buddhist logicians successfully subsume all non-perceptual cognitions (cognitions other than perception) under *anumāna* (inference).

II

When *anumāna* is verbalized we state its causal-ingredients in the form of syllogism. There may be a debate about number of premises in a syllogism and it may be increased or decreased as per the suitability of the respective schemes of epistemologies. But it is incontrovertible that each syllogism is in itself a speech-form and its members have an essential inter-relation among them. That is why they collectively become the producer of knowledge as *parārthānumāna* (inference for others). Hence it can be called knowledge deduced from a logical process, since logic as a mode of knowledge itself is fundamentally a science of speech-forms. Therefore, it can be maintained that logical departure of Indian epistemology begins with *parārthānumāna* (inference for others). However, it is maintained without implying the superiority or fundamentality of *parārthānumāna* over *svārthānumāna* since cognitive as well as certificatory force of knowledge-claims come from *svārthānumāna* itself which is later shaped in linguistic and logical form in *parārthānumāna* for the sake of others to attain the same inferential cognition. It is where logic begins. Importantly, a conception of epistemic moral responsibility is attached here with this departure of logic. That is, as the moral condition of exteriorization (verbalization) of resultant knowledge caused by direct perception (*śāksājñāna*) of the trustworthy person (*yathābhūtaupdeṣṭā*), likewise, the moral condition of exteriorization (verbalization) of resultant knowledge caused by *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself), i.e. of transmitting causal aspects of this knowledge through syllogistic propositions into others, is non-blemishing of syllogistic propositions; and the pre-condition of non-blemishing of syllogistic propositions is the validity of *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself). Perhaps, it is for this reason that we find an ideal commitment of maintaining the non-blemishing and truthfulness of syllogistic propositions in Indian logico-epistemic traditions. Hardly there is any other section of Indian epistemology wherein such an epistemological commitment of maintaining its non-blemishing and truthfulness has been shown with heroic attempt.

This epistemic moral commitment implicit in the formulation of *parārthānumāna* (inference for others) has been maintained and practiced successfully in both the traditions of logic, the Nyāya and the Buddhist. The *Naiyāyikas* took the approach of *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) centrality and the Buddhist logicians took the approach of *hetu* (reason/middle) centrality so far as the logical formulation of *parārthānumāna* is concerned. Since the *Naiyāyikas*' debate on *anumāna* has been *vyāpti*-centric, texts like *Vyāptipañcaka* were written in the tradition and the idea of *bahirvyāpti* was advocated by the Nyāya logicians to a great extent. Not only this, the idea of *hetvābhāsa* (blemish [inappropriately called in English *fallacy*] of reason/inference) was discussed a lot and subsequent revisions were made in the Nyāya tradition. However, the need for discussing the idea of *pakṣābhāsa* and *drṣṭāntābhāsa* was not felt. The only reason again was the adoption of *vyāpti*-centric approach to *anumāna*. Also, on account of the fact of inference being *vyāpti*-centric the

object of inference has been *vhanni-sāmānya* (fire-universal) in the Nyāya tradition. Opposite to this, in the Buddhist tradition of logic, from the beginning to the end, the *hetu*-centric approach to inference was adopted and developed. This is why, for the identification of *siddhahetu* (proven reason/middle) texts like *Hetucakra Damaru* and *Hetubindu* were written and the idea of *antarvyāpti* (internal concomitance) were advocated in the Buddhist tradition of logic. Along with this, attempts with full force were made in the tradition to identify *pakṣābhāsa*, *hetvābhāsa* and *drṣṭāntābhāsa* [5]. Acceptance of *vhanni-viśiṣṭa* (fire-particular) as the object of *anumāna* shows *hetu*-centricity in the Buddhist logic replacing *vyāpti*-centricity of the Nyāya. In fact, there have been these two prominent streams of debate on *anumāna* in Indian logic and epistemology. Both have their own commitments and specialities. They have tremendously enriched Indian epistemology and its systems of logic.

III

In Buddhist logic, the main components of *hetu*-centric *anumāna* are three types of *hetu* and three conditions of *hetu*. The *hetu* which leads to the indirect inferential knowledge can either be *svabhāva-hetu* or *kārya-hetu* or *anuplabdhi-hetu*. These are three types of *hetu*. The condition of being good or valid for each of these *hetu* is that it must be in *pakṣa*, also in *sapakṣa* and never be in *vipakṣa*. These are the three forms or conditions of *hetu*. Any deviation in these three conditions of *hetu* is considered by the Buddhist logicians as *hetvābhāsa* (defects of reason). Therefore, the Buddhist logic which is entirely free from possible states of *hetvābhāsa* and the statement *anumeyethatulyesadbhāvonāstitāsati* has been accepted by them as the right defining features of three-formed *hetu* as stated by Dignāga.⁵ This definition or characteristics of *hetu* in its collective form is the most balanced definition of *hetu*. Durveka Miśra [7, p. 90]⁶ informed that Buddhist scholars eliminated six-fold alternatives by using the method of exclusion of one-term (*ekpadaparyudās*) and exclusion of two-term (*dvipadaparyudās*) within this definition adopted this seventh alternative as a true characteristic of three-formed *hetu*. In Udyotkara's *Nyāyavārttika* [10, p. 56]⁷ the reference of this method is found as *Hetu Vārttika*. Vācaspati Miśra [8, p. 194] has beautifully explained and analyzed with suitable examples that how in this collective characteristic of *hetu* as mentioned by Dignāga, the seventh alternative is achieved by eliminating one-one and two-two terms. According to him, this characteristic or definition collectively consists of three terms. Among three terms when one-one term is eliminated three *pakṣa*-s or conditions are formed and when two-two terms are eliminated again three *pakṣa*-s conditions are formed. In these six types of *pakṣa* there are six-fold exclusionary states of three-fold *hetu*. When these six-fold states are eliminated the seventh (alternative) characteristic of *hetu* known as *siddhānta-Lakṣaṇa* is manifested, according to Dignāga. How six-fold cases are formed within the *Lakṣaṇa* (definition); how, by eliminating them and taking three terms within characteristic collectively, the seventh variety/case of *hetu* manifests right nature of three-formed *hetu*, can be demonstrated as the following:

1. If by performing exclusion of two terms (*dvipadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Anumeye Sadbhāvaḥ* then *dharma*, absent in *sapakṣa* and present in *vipakṣa*, will be called *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being effect.
2. If by performing exclusion of two terms (*dvipadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Tattulye Sadbhāvaḥ* then *dharma*, present in *vipakṣa* and absent in *pakṣa*, will become *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being the object of eyes, like universal.
3. If by performing exclusion of two terms (*dvipadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Nāstīā Asati* then *dharma*, absent in *pakṣa* and absent in *sapakṣa* too, will become *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being *asatva*.
4. If by performing exclusion of one term (*ekpadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Anumeye Ata Tattulye* then *dharma* present in *vipakṣa* will also be called *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is non-eternal, by being *prameya* (knowable).

5. If by performing exclusion of one term (*ekapadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Anumeye Atha Nāstitā Asati* then *dharma* absent in *sapakṣa* will become *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being produced (*jātimān*) and heard.

6. If by performing exclusion of one term (*ekapadaparyudāsa*) only this much is said, *Tattulye Nāstitā asati* then *dharma* absent in *pakṣa* will be called *hetu*. e.g. atoms are non-eternal, by being effect.

7. If by taking all three terms of definition collectively this is said, *Anumeyethattulyesadbhāvonāstitāsati* then *dharma*, present in *pakṣa*, present in *sapakṣa* and absent in *vipakṣa* will be called right *hetu*. e.g. *śabda* (word) is non-eternal, by being produced, like a pitcher.

In this way, the *trairūpya* (three-formed) *hetu* is formulated in seven-fold *hetu* (*hetu-saptaka*) and then by eliminating six unwanted and fallacious cases the seventh case is obtained; and this is how, in Buddhist logic, the *siddhānta Lakṣaṇa* of three-formed *hetu* is revealed. This method of seven-fold *hetu* must have been existed and practiced in Buddhist logic as is indicated by Durveka Miśra in his *Dharmottara Pradīpa*. However, he has not given any clear outline of it. Thanks to Vācaspati Miśra who has elaborated and preserved this unique methodology of Buddhist logic in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīka*.

IV

An advanced version of *hetu*-centric commitment in Buddhist logic is found in Ācārya Dignāga's *Hetucakra Damaru* (*Hetucakra Nirṇaya*) or Wheel of reason in which another unique method has been developed to identify *sadhetu* (good or valid reason) and *hetvābhāsa*-s by formulating *trairūpyahetu* (three-formed) into the logic of nine possible arguments or varieties (of cases). It is a small work of Dignāga which has not yet been found in its original form in Sanskrit. Dharmakīrti, while classifying *pakṣa-dharma* (*hetu*), has indicated about it as a method of providing an easy understanding of *hetuprakaraṇa* [3, Parārthānumāna Paricceda-189]. Its translation in Tibetan language is preserved. Based on this translation its Sanskrit restoration by Durgacharan Chatterjee and English translation (by Satishchandra Vidyabhusan and R.S.Y. Chi with some modifications in the text are available [11, p. 298, 1, pp. 266-272, 2, pp. xi-xii]. Some other scholars, Indian and Western, have written on *Hetucakra Damaru* in English and tried to understand Dignāga's classification of *pakṣa-dharma* in the light of Aristotelian logical system, predicate logic and class calculus. In the original literature of Indian epistemology and logic, the method and structure of *hetucakra Nirṇaya* has been preserved, though not entirely but in concise form, in Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatīka* [8, page 289-290].^{8,9} It is as follows:

Hetu which is *dharma* of *pakṣa* can acquire place in three possible cases, namely its presence, absence and both absence-presence (*dvedhābhāva*) (i.e. being in a space (part) of *sapakṣa* and also not being in another space (part) of *sapakṣa*). Again, the same *hetu* which is the *dharma* of *pakṣa* can have three cases in *vipakṣa*, namely, presence, absence and absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) in *vipakṣa*. Now, there can be three classes of each case of *hetu* among its three cases in *sapakṣa* and three classes of each case of *hetu* among its three cases in *vipakṣa*, thus calculatedly we get three classes of each case, of three-fold *hetu* i.e. total nine variety of cases. For example – 1) *hetu* (*pakṣa-dharma*) present in *sapakṣa* remains present in *vipakṣa*, 2) remains absent in *vipakṣa*, 3) remains present as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) in *vipakṣa*. Again, 4) *hetu* absent in *sapakṣa* (as *pakṣa-dharma*) remains present in *vipakṣa*, 5) remains absent in *vipakṣa*, 6) remains present as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) in *vipakṣa*. Similarly, 7) *hetu* (as *pakṣa-dharma*) being absent-present both (*dvedhābhāva*) in *sapakṣa* remains present in *vipakṣa*, 8) remains absent in *vipakṣa*, 9) remains present in *vipakṣa*, as absent-present both (*dvedhābhāva*). Dignāga, in his *Hetucakra Damaru*, has shown the formulations of *trairūpya* (three- formed) *hetu* in these nine varieties of cases and also demonstrated *hetu* (reason), *Sādhyā* (probandum) and *drṣṭānta* (instance) of each case. (In Vācaspati's presentation *drṣṭānta* has not been mentioned). It is as follows:

1. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* and present in *vipakṣa* too; e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being known (*prameya*), like ether (*sapakṣa*) and pitcher (*vipakṣa*). 2. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* but absent in *vipakṣa*; e.g. *śabda* (word) is non-eternal, by being produced, like pitcher (*sapakṣa*) and ether (*vipakṣa*). 3. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* and present in *vipakṣa* as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*); e.g. *śabda* (word) is produced through effort, by being non-eternal, like pitcher (*sapakṣa*) and lightening and ether (*vipakṣa*). 4. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is absent in *sapakṣa* but present in *vipakṣa*; e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being produced, like ether (*sapakṣa*) and pitcher (*vipakṣa*). 5. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is absent in *sapakṣa* and absent in *vipakṣa* too; e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being heard, like ether (*sapakṣa*) and pitcher (*vipakṣa*).¹⁰ 6. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is absent in *sapakṣa* and present in *vipakṣa* as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*); e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being produced through effort, like ether (*sapakṣa*) and pitcher and lightening (*vipakṣa*). 7. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) and present in *vipakṣa*; e.g. *śabda* (word) is without effort, as being non-eternal, like lightening and ether (*sapakṣa*) and pitcher (*vipakṣa*). 8. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) and absent in *vipakṣa*; e.g. *śabda* (word) is non-eternal as being produced through effort, like pitcher and lightening (*sapakṣa*) and ether (*vipakṣa*). 9. The *pakṣa-dharma (hetu)* which is present in *sapakṣa* as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*) and present in *vipakṣa* too as absence-presence both (*dvedhābhāva*)- e.g. *śabda* (word) is eternal, by being untouchable, like ether and atoms (*sapakṣa*) and action or karma (*vipakṣa*).¹¹

It is noticeable that among above-mentioned nine-fold formulations of *trairūpya* (three-formed) *hetu* only the second and the eighth formulations are the ones which satisfy the conditions of *trairūpya* (three-formed) *hetu*. Therefore, only these two are the right *hetus*. The fourth and the sixth formulations are the examples of *viruddhahetvābhāsa*. The rest five formulations are counted as *aniścita* (uncertain) or *saṅdigdha* (doubtful) *hetvābhāsa* (blemishes of reason).

V

From what has been analysed and elaborated above, it appears that in Buddhist logic an inherent epistemological strategy of Dignāga was operative behind the classification of *anumāna* (inference) into *svārthānumāna* (inference for oneself) and *parārthānumāna* (inference for others). This is that, how the teachings of Buddha (*Buddha-vacana-s*) can be freed from the binding of taking them as *śabdapramāṇa* (verbal testimony); and while subsuming them into *parārthānumāna* (inference for others) and how it can be maintained that the status and role of *Buddha vacana-s* is that of assertions generating *parārthānumāna*. *Parārthānumāna*, in Buddhist logic, provides the epistemological framework for fulfilling this internal conceptual demand of the tradition. Another epistemological significance of this classification is that a new dimension of exteriorization or verbalization (i.e. transmission) of personal cognition for the sake of others is revealed through it. In other words, the epistemology of exteriorization (verbalization)/transmission of knowledge freed from being *śabda pramāṇa* (verbal testimony) are offered by *parārthānumāna* (inference for others). Such an epistemology of *parārthānumāna* was developed in two parallel streams in post-Dignāga era. Its development took place, in Buddhist tradition, with *hetu*-centric commitment and in Nyāya tradition, with *vyāpti*-centric commitment. It is better not to give any value judgement about them by evaluating one in the light of the other; rather it is better to grasp them as two streams of thought in Indian logic with their inherent intents and conclusions. However, at the end, we would like to emphasize that such *hetu*-centric epistemology of *parārthānumāna* is unparallel and it is not like Aristotelian logic or predicate logic or with a logical system having class calculus and therefore unique. In other words, because of its unique nature, it does not have any necessity of its being understood in the light of formal systems of logic and their formulations.

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Notes

1. ‘Tāpāchhedācca nikaṣāt suvarṇmiva panditeiḥ’ [9, verse. 3587].
2. Tāḥprathamānvimarśaḥpunarāgmetasyārthasyadarśanam, Parārthānumānarūpakenājñāmātrake [6, ch. 1/135].
3. ‘Parārthānumāna Śabdātmakam, Svārthānumānam tu jñānātmakam’ [4, Svārthānumāna Pariccheda-1].
4. ‘Nanu ca parārthānumānotpādakvākyavadasti kiñcit vākyam yatparpratyakṣopyogi’. yatha ‘eṣa kalbho dhāvati’ iti vākyam. Ataḥ parārthānumānavatparārtham prtyakṣam kim na vyutpādyat iti? Atrocycate— parokṣārthapratipatteryāsāmagri – liṅgasya pakṣadharmatā sādhyavyāptiśca—tadākhyānāt vākyamupcārtaḥ parārthānumānamucyate.
Natu tatra kathañcidṅghāvamātreṇ, svasthyāderapi tathā prasaṅgāt. Idam punaḥ ‘ayam kalabh’ ityādivākyam na pratyāṣotpatteryā sāmagrīndriyālokādi tadbhidhānāntannimittam bhavattathā vyapadeśamśnute yen vyutpādyatāmpyaśnuvīta. Kim tarhi? kasyacid didrakṣāmātrajanana. Yathā kathañcitparapratyāṣotpattāva ṅghāmātreṇa tādrupyē netrotsave vastuni sannihiteapi kathañcitparāñmukhasya pareṇayadibhimukhīkaraṇam śirsastadapi vacanātmakam parārthapratyāṣam vutpādyituvrutpidyamāpadyet. Etacca kaḥ svasthātmā manasi niveśayet. Kiñc bhavatu tathāvidham vacanam parārtha pratyakṣam [7, p. 89].
5. Often this characteristic of Dignāga is referred from the second chapter of ‘Pramāṇasamuccaya’. In Udyotkara’s *Nyāyavārttika* too it has been called as characteristic of Dignāga’s hetu.
6. ‘Trirūpaliṅgāditi cācakṣāṇenācāryeṇeikadvipadparyudāsena ṣatpakṣīm pratikṣipyā saptampakṣa parigrahaṇe liṅgasya lakṣaṇamabhipretam prakāśitamīti’ [7, p. 90].
7. yadyapi hetuvārtika bruvāṇenoktam.... ‘saptikāsambhave ṣatpratiśedhādekadvipadaparyudāsen trilakṣaṇo heturiti’ [10, p. 56].
8. Vācaspati Mīśra has mentioned the same method with which Dignāga formed nine-fold variety of cases of trairūpyahetu. Manorathanandi (in *Pramāṇvārttika*, Parārthānumāna Paricceda, 189) has also hinted the same, saying ‘Sapakṣesannasandvedhā pakṣadharmāḥ punstridhā’ [8, pp. 289-290].
9. Vācaspati Mīśra has presented the summary of *Hetucakra Damaru* as following (*Nyāya Vārttika-Tātparya-Tīka*, pp. 289-290): Atrā Diñāgena – ‘Sapakṣe sannasan dvedhā pakṣadharmāḥ punstridhā. Pratyekam sapakṣe ca sadasaddvidhivataḥ.’
Iti navapakṣadharmān hetutadābhāsān darśayitvā

‘Tatra yaḥ sansajātīye dvedhā cāsanstadtyaye. Sa heturvīparītośmādviruddhoanyatvanīścitāḥ.’ ‘Iti hetutadābhāsaviveko darśitāḥ. Tasyārthāḥ. Yaḥ pakṣadharmāḥ sa sapakṣe sannasan dvedhā iti trividhāḥ, sa punarsapakṣe sadasaddvidhatvatatḥ pratyekam tridhā bhavātīti, pakṣadharmāḥ sapakṣe san vipakṣe sadasaddvidhatvatatḥ, pakṣadharmāḥ sapakṣe san vipakṣe sadasaddvidhatvatatḥ, pakṣadharmāḥ sapakṣe dvedhā sadasaddvidhatvatatḥ.’ Atrodāharaṇām, ‘Prameyakṛtkānityakṛtsrāvanyatnajāḥ. Anityayatnajāsparsā nityatvādiṣu te nav.’ nityatvādiṣu sādhyeṣu prameyatvādayo navahetutadābhāsaḥ. Teṣām yathāsaṅkhyam nityatvādīni sādhyānyudāharanti ‘Nityānityaprayatnotthamadyamtrikaśāśvatāḥ, Ayatnānityanityāśca prameyatvādisādhanāḥ.’ [8, pp. 289-290].

10. In restored text/translation of Durgacharan Chattarjee and S.C. Vidyabhusan it is read as ‘anitya’ (impermanent), whereas in the translation of R.S.Y. Chi and description of Vācaspati Miśra it is read as ‘nitya’ (eternal).

11. In restored text of Durgacharan Chattarjee it is read as ‘amūrta’ (incorporeal) and Randell and S.C. Vidyabhusan have put it as ‘sparsāja’ (touchable). R.S.Y. Chi has put it as ‘amūrta’ (incorporeal) and Vācaspati Miśra as ‘asparśaja’ (untouchable).